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the United States? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract: 
 This paper investigates whether the common practice of hedging the cost of fuel provides 
any economic benefits to participating airlines. Our study looks at 7 publically traded U.S. 
airlines over the course of 8 years, from 2008-2015, to determine whether revenue, income, 
financial leverage, credit quality, or the percentage of yearly fuel hedged contributes to an 
increase or decrease in overall firm value. We use Tobin's Q, which incorporates a company's 
market capitalization, outstanding stock, and assets and liabilities, as a proxy for firm value. We 
find statistically significant evidence that during this time period, a 1% increase in fuel hedge 
position results in a 0.01 point decrease in Tobin's Q.  When considering that changes in hedge 
position are often greater than 10%, it is evident that this trend could be very detrimental to 
airlines value. Our findings are consistent with the previous assertion that fuel hedging practices 
could have the potential of causing speculative factors that negatively influence US airline’s 
stock price.   
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Introduction  
The airline industry is a notoriously cut-throat sector known for frequent bankruptcies, 
ever increasing consolidation, and paper thin profit margins. One reason for the industries' 
cyclical nature is it's volatility to a number of key global economic drivers; most notably the 
price of crude oil. The recent volatility within the crude oil market has put some airlines hedge 
books far into the red. As with any hedge position, however, the actual economic value of the 
derivative can not be known until the position has expired. If the price of oil increases while the 
position is still active, the derivative could become much less detrimental to the airlines bottom 
line. Many airlines have historically put great emphasis and importance on their yearly hedge 
positions, and almost every airline in the U.S. currently holds fuel hedge derivatives. Due to its 
almost universal use within the sector, it is important to understand what potential benefits arise 
from the practice. Unfortunately, prior literature has become outdated in its analysis on the 
influence of hedging: In the past decade crude oil markets have drastically changed, the 
commercial airline sector has evolved, and technology has increased investors ability to access 
pertinent data. With the present volatility in the global economy, do fuel hedging derivatives 
provide any economic benefit to commercial airlines within the United States? 
The recent increase in the volatility of the global crude oil market created an economic 
environment in the commercial aviation sector where a study of this nature is more pertinent than 
it has previously ever been. In a little under two years, the price of WTI Crude Oil (CL.1 
NYMEX) has fallen from over $90 a barrel to just above $30 a barrel. This extreme drop off in 
the price of oil has been joyously welcomed by the sector as a whole, as one of its largest 
expenses is now 200% cheaper than in 2013. It has also, however, placed many airlines in the 
national spotlight for the wrong reasons. Southwest Airlines, which had slashed its fuel bills for 
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many years in the later 2000's, has now found itself on the cover of USA Today (2016) due to 
reports that it is financially liable, at current market prices, for $1.8 billion in fuel hedging costs 
through 2018. Similarly, Delta Airlines saved over $700 million in 4Q2015, however, fuel 
savings  would have totaled over $1 billion dollars had it not hedged its fuel consumption in that 
quarter. The losses created in times of low crude prices have led to some airlines ditching their 
hedge programs all together, yet it is typically these airlines that tend to loose the most when the 
price of crude jumps back up, as it did in 2008/2009.  
Although paying below market price for crude oil is a welcomed benefit of a hedging 
program, it is often not even the main objective. Fuel accounts for around 30% of an airline's 
costs when oil is around $50 a barrel [Morrell & Swan (2006:1)]. As the price of oil fluctuates, it 
creates large swings in unhedged airlines costs. Due to this, the main goal of a hedging program 
is to stabilize costs and, in-turn, profitability. In broad terms, hedging means locking in the cost 
of future purchases, and it gives airlines a better understanding of their costs for the year. This, in 
turn, gives airlines a better understanding of what it must do, and how it must perform, in order 
to obtain acceptable profitability. Stable fuel prices result in stable costs, which result in stable 
cash flows and, in turn, stable profits. This stability, according to hedge theory and airline 
management, results with a higher price for the airline's stock [Morrell & Swan (2006)]. While 
the theoretical justification for hedging fuel costs is historically weak, the assumption that 
hedging programs carry positive effects on firm value is one that is corroborated by the analysts 
who forecast airline stock prices. The aim of this paper is to evaluate the affects that fuel hedging 
has on firm value in the hopes of easing the on-going debate by both scholars and executives 
regarding the practice's reported economic benefits, or lack there-of. 
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In the next section we will explore the historical changes in the U.S. airline industry that 
spurred the increased use of fuel hedging; we will also explain the fundamental premise and 
types of hedges used in the industry today. We will then introduce previous literature relating to 
the question we have presented, in order to show what researchers have looked at in the past, and 
how they themselves have tried to answer this difficult question. Section 3 will present the 
financial and economic theory behind the concept of hedging. From there, we will start to 
present our study; first by presenting our hypothesis to this question, then by explaining the 
rationale behind how we conducted our research and data computation, and lastly by presenting 
our final econometric model and the results we obtained through regressing this model. We will 
conclude this paper by engaging in a discussion about our results, issues that arose during the 
course of our study, the potential policy implications of our results, and future research 
possibilities regarding commercial airline fuel hedging.      
Background 
In order to gain a better understanding of where the industry is going in the future, it is 
important to understand where it has come from in the past. One of the most important historical 
shifts in U.S. commercial aviation happened in 1978, with the Airline Deregulation Act. This 
policy change shifted control of route entry, route exit, and route pricing from the governmental 
Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) to the private airlines. This economic liberalization of air travel 
meant that airlines—who historically only competed on food, crew quality, flight experience, 
and frequency—would now compete on ticket price [Smith and Cox (2006)]. The new 
competitive price market resulted in fares dropping much lower, allowing many more people to 
fly, and, in turn, increasing route frequency and load factors. In fact, fares (adjusted for inflation) 
have fallen 25% since 1991, and are 22% lower than they would have been had regulation 
4 
 
continued—saving passengers over $19 billion a year [Smith and Cox (2006)]. Although airline 
deregulation was great for the passengers, it created fierce competition, allowed new entrants, 
and drastically slimmed margins within the commercial airline industry. The fierce nature of the 
industry has led to a huge amount of bankruptcies, mergers, and take-overs. Since 2001, Trans 
World Airlines (TWA) merged with American Airlines, US Airways merged with American 
West (retaining the US Airways name), Northwest Airlines and Delta Airlines (both in and out of 
bankruptcy at the time) merged, United and Continental merged (retaining the United name), 
Southwest Airlines acquired AirTran Airways, and American Airlines acquired U.S. Airways 
(Retaining the American name). In fact, just prior to the completion of this paper, on April 4th, 
2016, it was announced that Alaskan Airlines had acquired Virgin America as well.   
Despite the consolidation within the industry, its fierce competition mixed with the recent 
drop in crude oil has shown that there is still the possibility of economic viability for future 
hedging orders within the sector. Risk exposure is playing an increasing role within commercial 
aviation because, as we have highlighted above, there has been a decrease in airfares due to 
increasing competition. This, in turn, has made air travel a commodity market; making it 
impossible for airlines to raise ticket fares in response to higher fuel prices. In fact, fuel has 
increased as a percentage of average operating costs from 12% in 2001 to 33% in 2012 [IATA 
(2012)]. The influence of fuel cost fluctuation on an airlines bottom line also depends greatly on 
what business model the airline operates. There are two predominant types of models in 
commercial aviation today—legacy carriers and low-cost carriers (LCCs). “Legacy Carriers”, 
most notably Delta Airlines, United Airlines, and American Airlines, are airlines that had 
established interstate routes before the time of the Airline Deregulation Act. While changing 
business models and times have made the service of legacy carriers more undistinguishable 
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between their low-cost rivals, principally, legacy carriers are known for more luxurious service. 
For example, historically, legacy carriers have been known for their free-baggage service, 
catering on short and long haul flights, and an overall fancier and more personal service.  
Low-cost-carriers, on the other hand, cut costs at all corners in order to offer the cheapest 
ticket prices on the most travelled flight legs. Because of their cost cutting attempts, research has 
found that fuel costs account for a higher percentage of operating costs with LCCs than with 
legacy carriers. The reason for this is due to the fact that LCCs can influence the costs of staff, 
cleaning, airport fees, and operations; however, with fuel, these carriers must obey the market 
and pay the same price as legacy carriers. 
With a greater understanding of where the sector is today, it is important to understand 
what hedging is. Hedging is the strategy of transferring or decreasing risk by taking an equal and 
opposite position in two different markets. Specifically regarding large fuel consuming 
companies (like airlines), fuel hedges allow the companies to lock in prices and margins in 
advance, therefore reducing the potential risk of volatility within the fuel market. It also allows 
these companies to stabilize their fuel expenses, giving investors and executives a better 
understanding of where the company is going and what they must do to get there. While most 
companies who are overly dependent on fuel for daily operations engage in some form or 
percentage of fuel hedging, there are still some that do not. There are two main reasons why a 
company would not hedge. First, it may be because the company is not worried about volatility 
in the fuel market because it can pass on any and all increases in fuel prices to its consumers 
without affecting margins. Secondly, the company could be confident that the market price of 
fuel will drastically fall [Corley (2008)].   
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Specifically within the commercial aviation sector, there are three main types of contracts 
used for fuel hedging. The first option is over-the-counter (OTC) contracts such as swaps, 
options, and combinations (collars). The risks of OTC contracts will be explored later in this 
review. The second option that airlines have is futures contracts that are traded on an exchange. 
While this option tends to be slightly less risky than its OTC counterparts, its inherent risks will 
also be explored later in this review. Lastly, airlines have the option not to hedge their fuel 
consumption.  
 Literature Review  
 Carter, Rodgers, and Simkins (2004) studied the economic sense of hedging fuel for 
airlines. In order to do this, they obtained the fuel hedging data of all US airlines between the 
years of 1994 to 2000. Using a two-factor model incorporating weekly time-series regressions, 
the researchers figured out the sensitivity of stock returns to jet fuel price changes. Carter, 
Rodgers, and Simkins found that in times of higher fuels costs, unhedged airlines tended to have 
negative cash flow exposures, while hedged airlines tended to have positive cash flows. It was 
also found that the largest carriers (also found to be the most active hedgers of jet fuel) tended to 
have a smaller relation between jet fuel prices and cash flows than most other carriers. The 
researchers concluded that the higher cash flows associated with lower fuel costs is mainly the 
result of an airline decreasing its outside investment. This resulted in what the researchers argue 
is the principle benefit of hedging; a reduction in underinvestment costs. Underinvestment costs 
are a problem within a company where it refuses to invest in low-risk assets, and instead seeks 
out bigger streams of income, even if the risk potentially comes close or outweighs the reward. 
In examining the use of foreign currency derivatives (FCDs) and their potential impact on 
firm value, George Allayannis and James P. Weston (2001) find corroboratory evidence of the 
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importance of financial hedging. Their paper “The use of Foreign Currency Derivatives and Firm 
Market Value” looked at 720 large U.S. nonfinancial firms between the years of 1990 and 1995. 
While not all of these companies were airlines, the study is still extremely important to financial 
hedging research, as it shows the importance of companies hedging large costs. The 720 firms in 
this study were all very active within the export/import market, causing exchange rate 
fluctuations to be their largest and most volatile costs—similar to how jet fuel is airline’s largest 
and most volatile cost. Allayannis and Weston used a fixed effects model that incorporated 
Tobin’s Q as a proxy for firm value and variables accounting for firm size, profitability, 
leverage, growth opportunities, the ability to access financial markets, geographic and industrial 
diversification, credit quality, and time. In using these other variables, they aimed to explain 
whether the hedging premium can be explained by other factors that theories suggest may affect 
firm value and Q. Tobin’s Q, alternatively referred to as the Q Ratio, is a measure of firm value. 
A Q ratio between 0 and 1 means that the value of a company’s stock is less than the cost it 
would take to replace the firm’s assets, creating the perception that the stock is undervalued. 
Alternatively, the stock of a company is viewed as overvalued if its Q value is greater than 1. 
Allayannis and Weston found that users of currency derivatives (risk hedging) had consistently 
higher mean and median Qs than nonusers. In addition, they found that hedging added value both 
during the dollar’s appreciating and depreciating period; however, the hedging premium was 
much larger (and statistically significant) during years in which the dollar was appreciating. 
Britta Berghöfer and Brian Lucey (2014), it their article “Fuel Hedging, Operational 
Hedging and Risk Exposure – Evidence from the Global Airline Industry”, find results that are 
contrary of both Carter, Rodgers, Simkins, and Allayannis and Weston. Berghöfer and Lucey 
looked at the effectiveness of operational and financial hedging within the global airline industry 
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by analyzing 20 European airlines, 20 Asian airlines, and 24 US airlines in a 10-year span from 
2002 to 2012. In order to measure the effect of financial hedging, they used a fixed effects 
regression model, while incorporating panel data, and regressed the dependent variable —an 
exposure coefficient measuring for both specific airline and year—on the percentage of next 
year’s fuel requirements hedged, the maximum hedging maturity in months, the amount of fleet 
diversity, as well as the long term debt to asset ratio—which takes financial distress into account, 
and the logarithm of average flight distance. The researchers concluded that highly exposed 
airlines have higher leverage and are larger in size. While these airlines had greater fleet 
diversification and longer routes, they did not differ significantly in their percentage of fuel 
hedged or percentage of periods hedged. In other words, jet fuel hedging did not reduce 
exposure.  
Similar to the results obtained in the study conducted by Allayannis and Weston, it is 
important to understand how different hedging strategies affect airlines stock price— whether 
that is based on the airline’s fundamentals or on more speculative factors. In order to test for this, 
Carter, Rodgers, and Simkins returned to their model using a dependent variable of the 
company’s rate of common stock return in week t, and regressed this on the return to the Center 
for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) value weighted market portfolio, the percentage change 
in Oil Price Information’s (OPIS) jet fuel prices, and an estimated coefficient measuring the 
sensitivity of a firm’s stock price to changes in jet fuel prices. Through this analysis, they found 
that fuel price risk management (hedging) does not materially alter the exposure of airline stock 
prices to changes in jet fuel prices. Therefore, hedging apparently has no effect on the sensitivity 
of an airline’s stock price to jet fuel prices. It is important to note, however, that if the market 
expects airlines to invest marginal cash flow in positive net present value projects, then investors 
9 
 
should place positive value on jet fuel hedging. The researchers also explain, however, that if 
investors view an airlines investment unfavorably, hedging could have negative value 
consequences.  
Berghöfer and Lucey, to the contrary, found that hedging practices could have the 
potential of causing speculative factors that influence the price of US airline’s stock prices. Out 
of the Asian, European, and American airlines that they looked at in their study, American 
airlines were the most exposed to fuel prices. The researchers believe that this potentially sprung 
from investor concerns (speculation); because if fuel priced induced market expectations led to 
changes in airline stock prices the exposure coefficients could then be affected simultaneously. 
As was described previously, there are both issues and alternatives to aviation fuel 
hedging. One of the major issues with aviation fuel hedging is that kerosene (jet fuel) is not 
actively traded on any exchange funds, such as the New York Mercantile Exchange (NYMEX) 
or the Intercontinental Exchange (ICE). Due to this, hedging of jet fuel must be done over-the-
counter (OTC).  There are, however, inherent risks with trading OTC, such as illiquidity and 
associated counterparty risks. Since kerosene is only traded OTC, and OTC trades carry more 
risk, airlines typically “cross-hedge” their fuel demand with commodities that trade on 
commodity exchanges such as the ones highlighted above. Commodities that share the most 
similar characteristics as kerosene are crude oil, heating oil, and gasoil. Although gasoil typically 
shows the strongest correlation, crude and heating oils are most often used by airlines. In fact, in 
the US aviation industry, crude oil accounts for the biggest share of underlying commodities 
with 39.1% (heating oil – 30.9%, kerosene – 24.6%). Kerosene spot prices and crude oil spot 
prices, however, have correlation factor of only 0.63 since 2002. The imperfect correlation of the 
price of an underlying cross hedge instrument with its purchased asset price is called “basis risk” 
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[Carter et al. (2004)]. Meanwhile, the specific difference between crude oil spot prices and jet 
fuel spot prices is referred to as the “crack spread”. It is extremely important to note that the 
“crack spread” is shown to widen during times of higher volatility in crude oil prices.   
Due to the inherent risk involved in hedging, many researchers have explored alternatives 
to the practice. One alternative, put forward by Berghöfer and Lucey, is operational hedging. 
Operational hedging, in the form of fleet diversification, would allow airlines to deploy smaller 
aircraft to counteract lower demand within a market, often due to a weakening economic 
environment and/or higher fuel prices. In theory, this operational hedge would allow load factors 
to be maintained at high or higher levels. There are, however, some potential drawbacks to this 
strategy. First, different aircraft types require different type ratings; with each additional type 
rating creating greater training costs for pilots and their subsequent airlines. Furthermore, 
different aircraft require different spare parts, different flight crews, and different ancillary 
equipment. Berghöfer and Lucey tested this hedging alternative by applying a variable that 
accounts for the amount of fleet diversification within an airline. They found that a more diverse 
fleet increases airline risk exposure as opposed to decreasing it. In fact, a 1% increase in fleet 
diversity would lead to an increase of the risk exposure coefficient by 1.83%. This result, 
however, is not advising against an airline having a diverse fleet, but it is advising against an 
airline purposely diversifying its fleet in order to decrease risk. Some airlines have strictly 
domestic route structures and, therefore, have the ability to operate one type of aircraft. 
Examples of this would be Southwest Airlines and its fleet of Boeing 737, or JetBlue Airlines 
and its fleet of Airbus 320 ad 321’s (which do not require different type ratings). On the other 
hand, some airlines (especially legacy carriers) have business models that require the need for 
different aircraft. For example, United Airlines has a fleet of wide body Boeing 747’s that are 
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used for long haul service. Within the US, however, United flies Boeing 737, 717, Airbus 320, 
319 and other aircraft on their shorter-haul routes. United has clearly done a cost-to-benefit 
analysis and has concluded that this route model—which requires different aircraft—can bring in 
more profits than the cost savings the company could make through operating only one aircraft 
type.  
Another alternative to fuel hedging is, in fact, no hedging at all. According to the 
Modigliani Miller Paradigm, risk management is irrelevant to individual firms because 
shareholders can do risk management on their own through a well-diversified investment 
portfolio [Sprčić, D. M. (2013)]. A study done by DeMarzo and Duffie (1995) find conflicting 
results to this theory, however, as they find that even though shareholders can hedge on their 
own, hedging is optimal when managers have private information on the firm’s expected profits.  
Lastly, we look at Allayannis and Weston’s exploration of the theory of reverse 
causation. Reverse causation states that firms with high Tobin’s Q have an incentive to hedge 
because they may already have high growth opportunities. Likewise, firms that remain unhedged 
and firms that quit hedging in the next period will do so because these firms already have lower 
values than firms that remained unhedged. In simpler terms, the theory states that hedging 
practices are determined by firm value, but firm value is not determined by hedging practices—
hence reverse causation. These authors tested for reverse causation before running their 
preliminary regressions in order to rule it out. They rejected the hypothesis that firms with larger 
Qs choose to hedge, and firms with lower Qs choose to remain unhedged.  
            Through the analysis of past literature, there are many things that are apparently clear. 
Fuel hedging is a form of risk management investment derivative that is both tremendously 
complex and also financially risky. The reason why it is so important for airlines to understand 
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the complexity and risks involved in hedging is because, as specifically seen in this age, by 
agreeing to a fixed price of fuel, airlines are facing the potential of losing or gaining a lot of 
money. Unfortunately for airlines, the extreme drop in crude prices today has created great losses 
in the hedge books of many airlines worldwide. The understanding of what hedging strategies 
can do to an airlines value will give airline executives a better foundation to make hedging 
strategies in the future. In a current market of extremely volatile crude prices, that this is an 
extremely important foundation to have.  
Relevant Theory 
The basic rational behind financial hedging implies that possible economic success is 
attainable due to inherent friction in the Modigliani Miller (M&M) Paradigm. The M&M 
Paradigm was first theorized by Franco Modigliani and Merton Miller in 1958. The original 
propositions under the theory were: A.) A firm's total market value is independent of its capital 
structure, and B.) A firm's cost of equity increases with its debt-equity ratio [Haas (N/A)] . Due 
to these assumptions, risk management is irrelevant to the firm because investors can attain their 
desired risk level through a well diversified portfolio. For example, an investor who owns shares 
in an airline can hedge the potential risk of fuel price increases by also purchasing shares in oil 
companies. Being so, the transaction costs an airline would incur through hedging practices 
would completely eliminate the economic benefit of risk management. Moreover, according to 
the "irrelevance theorem" within the paradigm, corporate hedging could actually harm 
shareholders, as it would skew the risk level in their own portfolio [Krawiec (2004:3)]. In order 
for this to be true, however, several assumptions must hold. Investors must have accurate 
information regarding all firms systemic risk exposure in order to formulate a portfolio that 
aligns with he/she's desired risk level, and capital markets must be perfect. "Perfect", in this 
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sense, means the market has no taxes, bankruptcies, or agency costs. The friction is introduced 
into the theory because in the real world, most capital markets are imperfect.   
Although this theory is based more firmly in finance than in economics, its intellectual 
power has led many economists to form relevant theory rooted in M&M. Joseph Stiglitz, 
Professor of Economics at Stanford University, once wrote (1988): 
 "What has not been sufficiently emphasized is the importance of 
the paper to the development of economic theory and practice. 
Indeed, it is ironic that a paper which purportedly established that 
one need not pay any attention to financial structure—that 
financial structure was irrelevant—should have focused 
economists' attention on finance."  
One of the most important theories coming out of M&M is investment theory. In their study of 
this theory, Froot, Sharfstein, and Stein (1993) found that hedging adds value to the corporation 
by ensuring that it has sufficient funds available to take advantage of attractive investment 
opportunity; similar to the findings of Carter, Rodgers, and Simkins regarding hedging's role in 
reducing underinvestment costs. This shows that while the basic principles behind the M&M 
Paradigm are uprooted in modern economics, the economic principles presented in the theory 
still have great importance in today's research.  
Hypothesis 
It is important to note that our proxy for firm value, Tobin's Q (Q), accounts for both 
changes in an airlines fundamental's (through changes in its assets), and changes in the markets 
view of the firm: by accounting for both market cap and the value of outstanding preferred stock. 
Carter, Rodgers, and Simkins found that hedging practices had no effect on the exposure of stock 
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prices to jet fuel. They also found that hedged airlines have greater positive cash flows, therefore, 
creating the potential of increased assets (through a reduction in underinvestment). Allayannis 
and Weston found concluding evidence regarding the effects of hedging: that hedge positions 
increase Q value. Our hypothesis corroborates the findings of these researchers. We base this 
assumption on the fact that investors typically look for greater stability within the company that 
they choose to invest in, especially in today's volatile markets. As we have explained within the 
literature review section, hedge positions typically increase this stability. The time frame which 
we studied played an important role in our hypothesis. Previous literature conducted by Carter, 
Rodgers, Simkins, Allayannis, and Weston all took place between the years of 1990 to 2000. As 
the graph below shows, the price of West Texas Intermediate (WTI) crude oil was relatively 
stable during this period; climbing no higher than $46 a barrel, and no lower than $11 a barrel.  
 
Our data, on the other hand, was collected between 2008 and 2015, which, as the graph below 
shows, was a very volatile time for crude oil. During this 8 year span, the price of WTI crude oil 
climbed to over $140 a barrel in 2008, preceded to fall to around $35 a barrel in 2009, and then 
steadily climbed back up to over $100 a barrel, until finally dropping to below $40 just last year. 
These graphs show the clear macro-economic differences between the studies. 
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This is important because we believe that in highly volatile times, investors will put an even 
greater emphasis on cost stability. It is our assumption, then, that the airlines in our study with 
larger hedge books will be rewarded with higher Tobin's Q values, because, in-theory, these 
airlines will be more stable. 
Research Methodology  
In order to conduct the research, 7 airlines were evaluated based on 6 variables spanning 
8 years. In order for an airline to qualify for the study, it had to fulfill two requirements. The first 
requirement was that the airline had to be based in the U.S. and actively traded on a U.S. stock 
index (NYSE, Dow Jones, S&P 500). This requirement eliminated large operators in North 
American such as Air Canada (Canada), WestJet (Canada), Volaris (Mexico), Interjet (Mexico), 
and British Airways (England). The second requirement was that the airline must operate a fleet 
of at least 50 aircraft. This requirement was used to control for the size of airline operations; it 
eliminated Sun Country Airline (U.S.). It is important to note that most "regional" airlines 
operations were included in our study despite the airline not being accounted for. The reason for 
this is because of an operational tactic used within the commercial aviation sector where a 
regional carrier (Such as Republic Airlines, fleet size 151) conducts operations on behalf of 
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United Airlines. Under the agreement, United Airlines covers the fuel costs of those operations. 
It would therefore be irrelevant to include regional airlines because they have no fuel costs, but 
instead, their fuel costs from operations are included within the data for the respective non-
regional carriers for which they operate. In addition, American Airlines, Frontier Airlines, and 
Delta Airlines were excluded from this study due to a lack of data. This is an area we hope can 
be included in further studies as Delta and American are two of the larger players within the 
current market. The lack of data pertaining to the two airlines, however, created large gaps in our 
dataset that could otherwise not be accounted for. Based on these requirements, the carriers that 
we evaluated in this study were United Airlines, Alaska Airlines, Southwest Airlines, Allegiant 
Airlines, Spirit Airlines, Hawaiian Airlines, and JetBlue Airways. In order to accurately study 
the effects of hedging position on each airline, we used Tobin's Q as a measure of firm value. 
Tobin's Q data for each of the 7 airlines was obtained from YCharts. YCharts is a financial data 
research platform that has been used by the Chicago Tribune, Forbes, Barron's, and Investment 
News for data research and analytics. Although it is a web service, because of its wide usage by 
accredited journals and news outlets, we believe in the validity of the Tobin's Q values we 
obtained. The calculation of Tobin's was progressed by Kee H. Chung and Stephen W. Pruitt and 
can be calculated as follows (4): 
Approximate Q = (Market Cap + Value of firm's 
outstanding preferred stock + Value of firm's short term liabilities 
net of short-term assets) / Total Assets (Book Value of Total Assets 
of the Firm)  
As we explained in the literature review section, a Q value between 0 and 1 means that a stock is 
undervalued in the market. Alternatively, if a stock's Q value is greater than one, it is overvalued 
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in the market. We also analyzed each airline based on the profitability metrics of revenue and net 
income. Although some may argue that including both revenue and net income can create 
multicollinearity within our data, our post-estimation tests conclude that there was none present. 
We believe it is especially important to account for both metrics within the aviation sector 
because, as we said above, profit margins are historically low for all airlines. An airline that 
brings in a high revenue figure in one year, therefore, does not necessarily make a higher income 
that year, as the reduction of costs is often one of the largest reasons for financial success in the 
sector. We also account for revenue and net income in order to exclude the effects that these two 
variables could have on firm value. According to Allayannis and Weston (2001): 
"A profitable firm is likely to trade at a premium relative to a less 
profitable one. Thus if hedgers are more profitable, they will have 
higher Qs." 
We obtained revenue and net income data from Yahoo! Finance and from the various airlines 10-
Ks when the data was otherwise not available. Financial leverage was also accounted for due to 
the possibility that a firm's capital structure may play a role in its overall value. We obtained our 
data from Morningstar Investment Research, which calculates financial leverage as follows: 
Financial Leverage = Total Assets / Total Shareholders' Equity 
The sixth variable we used accounted for the credit quality of each airline. We obtained the 
credit ratings of all corporate debt issued by the airlines over the eight year time span from 
Moody's. Moody's rates corporate debt on a 20 tier system with "Aaa" being the best (Investment 
Grade: Minimal Credit Risk) and "C" being the worst (Speculative Grade: In Default, with little 
chance of recovery). While no corporate debt issued by the airlines in this time frame fell below 
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"Caa3" (Speculative Grade: Very High Credit Risk), or went higher than "Aa3" (Investment 
Grade: Very Low Credit Risk), it was not practical for us to find a way to quantify each rating so 
that it was acceptable for STATA. Instead, we assigned dummy variables based upon the 
movements of debt ratings over the 8 year span. Debt that stayed the same or increased in a fiscal 
year was assigned the value "0", while debt that was downgraded in rating was assigned a value 
of "1". The goal of this study was to assess how changes in one variable effect firm value, we 
therefore felt that this is an appropriate way to account for credit rating as it explored the effects 
of negative changes in credit rating. We understand that positive changes in rating (a credit 
upgrade) will not be accounted for in this study, but we felt that the potential influence that a 
credit downgrade would have on Q was more pertinent to our potential conclusions, and 
therefore accounted for that in our regression analysis.   
 The last variable used in this study is the percentage of yearly fuel hedged by each 
airline. This information was found in each airlines yearly 10-K. An example of how JetBlue 
stated its hedging strategy within its annual report is as follows (2013):  
 
"We maintain a diversified fuel hedge portfolio by entering into a 
variety of fuel hedge contracts in order to provide some protection 
against sharp and sudden volatility as well as further increases in 
fuel prices. In total, we hedged 21% of our total 2013 fuel 
consumption."  
Based upon the strategy that JetBlue has highlighted above, it will take the value of 21.00 for the 
percentage hedged variable in 2013. It is important to note that the exact percent of fuel hedged 
is not something that airlines are required to disclose, although almost all do. The percentage 
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hedged variable is, therefore, not always exact. For instance, Hawaiian Airlines does not disclose 
the percent of fuel they hedged out each year, the Airline does, however, provide the values of 
fuel consumed per year and fuel hedged per year in gallons. In this instance, we calculated the 
percentage of fuel hedged each year. Additionally, fuel hedging can be done in a variety of ways 
(as was explained in the literature review) but for the purposes of this study, the aggregate of all 
the various methods was only accounted for. This was done for two reasons; first, the aggregate 
percent was given more frequently in each 10-K, we were therefore more confident in its overall 
efficacy. Second, it follows what was done in the previous literature. Lastly, it is important to 
note that Allegiant Airlines does not hedge its fuel consumption. Allegiant's percentage hedged 
variable therefore took on the value of 00.00 for all years including and in-between 2008 and 
2015, which is still very important for our regression analysis.  Table 1, in the list of tables at the 
end of this paper, provides descriptive statistics for all of our variables.  
The Final Econometric Model 
 In order to observe the data that we have highlighted above, we use a longitudinal, or 
panel, data set. The final population regression function is as follows: 
Tobinsit= α + β1revit + β2incomeit + β3finlevit + β4dummyit + β5hedgeit + εit 
Where: 
Tobins: Individual Airline's Tobin's Q 
Rev: Individual Airline's Yearly Revenue 
Income: Individual Airline's Yearly Income 
Finlev: Individual Airline's Yearly Financial Leverage 
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Dummy: Credit Quality Dummy 
Hedge: Individual Airline's Yearly Fuel Hedged (%) 
εit: Error Term  
In accordance with our theoretical model and previous literature, we expected an increase 
in fuel hedge position to have a positive effect on firm value, making its sign positive in our 
regression analysis. We expected a debt rating decrease, which is signified by a dummy quantity 
of "1", to have a negative effect on firm value. We also expected an increase in leverage (finlev) 
to negatively affect Q. Lastly, we expect rev, and income to have a positive influence on firm 
value.  
We benefit from using a panel data set because it allows us to observe our data in the 
cross sectional dimension (airlines) and the time series dimension (years). The main advantages 
of this style of data analysis is its ability to improve the efficiency of the econometric estimates 
found in this study by allowing for more degrees of freedom and more sample variability. This, 
in-turn, allows for a more accurate inference of model parameters.  
Prior to running our regression, we had to run two tests in order to guarantee the validity 
of our results. A Hausman Test was first conducted to determine whether a fixed or random 
model was the appropriate model to conduct our regressions. A Hausman Test compares a 
weighted square of the difference between the two β estimators of the random and fixed models 
[University of Vermont (2009:2)]. The resulting X2 statistic is what determines if we reject, or 
fail to reject, the null hypothesis. Under the null hypothesis, the random effect model is 
appropriate; the fixed model, on the other-hand, is appropriate under the alternative hypothesis. 
Our Hausman test resulted in an X2 value of 0.559, which is much greater than 0.05. Under this 
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conclusion, we failed to reject the null hypothesis, and we used the random effects model to 
conduct our regression.  
A Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) test was also conducted prior to running our 
regressions. This was done to test for multicollinearity within our model. The VIF scores for all 
six variables remained under the threshold value of five, therefore indicating that the model does 
not contain multicollinearity. Table 2, in the list of tables at the end of this paper, provides a 
more in depth look at the results of the VIF test. After conducting these robustness checks on our 
variables, we concluded that the OLS estimates for our final model were the best linear unbiased 
estimator (BLUE) and, therefore, ready to be regressed.  
Regression Analysis  
The data obtained through our regression analysis violated three out of the five 
expectations we had for the independent variables. According to our regression analysis, a $1 
billion dollar increase in revenue results in a 0.006 point decrease in Tobin's Q. Considering that 
the minimum Tobin's Q value in our dataset was 0.317 and the maximum value was 3.24, a 
decrease of 0.006 could actually be very negative to a firm. It is also important to note, however, 
that the p-value for this variable was statistically insignificant. A decrease in credit quality 
(dummy) also violated our assumption as our regression showed that a credit quality downgrade 
resulted in a 0.29 point increase in Q. This result is also statistically insignificant, with a p-value 
of 0.910. Income and financial leverage matched our expectations that an increase in income 
would increase Q and an increase of leverage would decrease Q. The values we obtained from 
both variables were not exceptionally pertinent, however, as their results were both statistically 
insignificant and showed extremely small changes in Q. According to our results, a one point 
increase in financial leverage resulted in a 0.0004 point decrease in Q while a $1 million increase 
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in income led to a 0.00007 increase in Q. Our regression results did yield a very interesting result 
regarding hedge percentage. According to our regression analysis, a 1% increase in an airlines 
hedge position for year t resulted in a 0.009 point decrease in the company's Q. This result shows 
that in the volatile crude market period spanning from 2008 to 2015, fuel hedging had a negative 
effect on firm value. The hedge variable's p-value was statistically insignificant at 0.057, 
however, the value we obtain provides an economic trend that was seen in the U.S. commercial 
aviation sector between 2008 and 2015. This regression explains 35% of the variability of the 
response data around its mean. The descriptive statistics of model 1 are shown in Table 3 of the 
list of tables at the end of this paper.   
As we have said above, however, we found fundamental issues regarding the inclusion of 
our dummy variable accounting for credit quality. We feel that the dummy variable does not 
accurately account for the effects that a credit downgrade would have on firm value. Due to this, 
we decided to run a second regression analysis on a model which did not include this dummy 
variable. This dummy variable was not included in the regressions run by previous researchers, 
so we feel that excluding it from this regression would not be an example of "data mining"--or 
the intentional deletion of variables to seek a predetermined result. The new model (Model 2) is 
as follows: 
Tobinsit= α + β1revit + β2incomeit + β3finlevit + β4hedgeit + εit 
The regression of this new model explains 38% of the variability of the response data around its 
mean. Revenue (rev) and financial leverage (finlev) still negatively influence Q value, and 
income still positively influences Q value. As we saw with the previous model, all of these 
variables yield statistically insignificant results. Where the model gets interesting is in its result 
for the hedge percentage variable. According to this model, a 1% increase in an airlines hedge 
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position for year t results in a 0.01 point decrease in Q. Similar to the previous model's 
regression, this outcome suggests that an increase in fuel hedging negatively effects an airlines 
value. The outcome of this variable is statistically significant at the 5% level. Although 0.01 is a 
rather small change in Q, it is important to note that this change is observed only a 1% increase 
in yearly fuel hedged. When an airline changes its hedge position, it is often by 10%, 20%, and 
sometimes even 50%. Due to this, that 0.01 point figure could be drastically larger depending on 
an airlines strategy. This shows the economic significance of the trend. For a more in-depth view 
of Model 2's descriptive statistics, please consult Table 4 of the list of tables at the end of this 
paper 
Discussion 
Prior to discussing our results, we first aim to acknowledge the limitations and 
deficiencies within our study. First, we believe that the method by which we incorporated credit 
quality into our first model was inherently flawed and could have skewed our results. To remedy 
this problem, we excluded the dummy variable from our second model and are therefore more 
confident in this new model's results. Secondly, the airline industry within the U.S. is a highly 
consolidated industry by nature. Due to this, all research that studies the industry at the airline 
level—as we have done in our study—lacks a significant amount of observations. In fact, the 
number of observations within our study is 46, which is considered low. Due to the low number 
of observations, it would be inappropriate for us to extrapolate our findings to other time periods 
and other countries. Our rather low r-squared value also indicates that it would be inaccurate to 
imply that our findings would be similar to that of findings during times of less volatility within 
crude markets. We are confident, however, that our regression analysis shows that in times of 
highly volatile crude markets, increases in hedge percentage decreases firm value. One might say 
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that this outcome is expected, because by hedging in times of crude oil price declines, airlines 
typically lessen their potential gains had they simply purchased fuel at market price. We believe 
that this is a fair argument, and definitely a possible reasoning behind our results. It is important 
to note though, that from March 2009 until March 2011, the price of crude oil rose rapidly. It is 
expected that during this time, airlines that were engaged in hedging activity were consuming jet 
fuel at a price below market value. Since the time period we studied included a period of rapid 
crude price increase (03/2009-03/2011), of relative stability (04/2011-02/2014), and of rapid 
crude price decrease (03/2014-12/2015), it is far too simplistic to connect the negative 
relationship of hedge percentage and Q to the assumption that it's because airlines are now 
paying more than market price for fuel.  
It is important to note that a decrease in Q indicates an airline's stock is becoming less 
valued in the market place. Remember, a Q value between 0 and 1 indicates that a stock is 
undervalued. It is possible that an airline included in this study could increase hedge percentage 
in a year and still remain an overvalued stock, as it could have already been well above that 1 
ceiling, however, our results indicate that the stock would start trending towards becoming 
undervalued (Q<1). A potential for this drop in Q could be speculative factors that are affecting 
the stock's market cap or value of outstanding stock. Regardless of the reason, a decline in Q is 
almost always a cause for concern for public companies. This is due to the fact that as the 
company's stock becomes undervalued, the cost to replace the firm's assets are greater than the 
book value of its equity [Damodaran (2000:3)].  
This outcome contradicts Allayannis and Weston's finding that risk hedging adds firm 
value during times when the hedged commodity gains and loses value; as we find that increases 
in hedging actually reduces firm value. Our finding also contradicts the Modigliani Miller 
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Paradigm, as we find evidence that risk management is relevant to shareholders even though they 
can do risk management through the asset allocation of their own portfolio's. We do, however, 
consult Berghöfer and Lucey's study for potential reasons behind our result. As we specified 
previously, these researchers concluded that hedge strategies could have a negative influence on 
stock price if investors speculated against airline stocks citing concerns in the crude oil market. 
This assumption could also be a potential reasoning behind our results. Perhaps, the common 
investor does not have a complete understanding of fuel hedging programs and the cost stability 
that they provide, instead, the investor simply fears the potential volatility that airline stocks may 
have in response to jumps in crude price. In fact, according to the research done by Carter, 
Rodgers, and Simkins, hedging does not effect the sensitivity of an airline's stock price to jet fuel 
price. This finding could potentially support the theory that airline stock prices are traded not by 
what an airline is hedged out to pay per gallon, but what the market price per gallon of jet fuel is 
instead. If this theory holds, airline management may re-think the efficacy of spending great 
amounts of time and capital on fuel hedging divisions when the market does not value the cost 
stability that the program may generate.  
While this discussion is done solely to connect different findings in the various literature 
on risk hedging, and is therefore speculative in nature, our results still show an important result 
that could reshape managements rationale behind hedging programs and strategies. While some 
airlines make out very well on hedge positions in times of rising crude prices, today we see the 
negative effects that hedge positions have on airlines during times of declining crude prices. 
While the theory behind hedging is to minimize the swings within an airline's cost structure, if 
the market does not value this stability, but actually penalizes the practice which enables it, is 
hedging still a worth wile financial tool for airlines in the US?  
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Conclusion  
The goal of our research was to determine whether changes in an airline's hedge positon 
provided any economic benefit to the airline's overall firm value. We believed that an increased 
hedge position would increase Tobin's Q as the market rewarded, through an increased stock 
price, the airline for the cost stability that the hedge position provided. By analyzing 7 U.S. based 
airlines over an 8 year span and regressing the data that we compiled, we found that an increased 
hedge position actually decreases firm value. According to our regression, a 1% increase in an 
airlines yearly hedge position resulted in a .01 point decrease in that airline's Tobin's Q value. 
This result was statistically significant at the 5% level. It is important to note that the U.S. 
commercial aviation sector is a highly consolidated segment, and due to this, our model lacked a 
large amount of observations. While our conclusions cannot help anticipate how hedging 
practices could affect airline value in other countries or during periods of stability within crude 
markets, we believe that our findings are important for the U.S. commercial aviation sector 
during periods of high price volatility within the crude oil market.   
The recent drop in the price of crude oil has led many airlines in the U.S. to reduce their 
hedge positions and, in some cases, to abandon the practice overall. History shows, however, that 
as the price of crude oil increases again, airlines will subsequently begin to increase or reinstate 
their hedge practice. This leads to the interesting question of whether the current policies in place 
are sufficient to allow for the appropriate use of financial derivatives within the commercial 
aviation sector moving forward.  
Due to the dearth of evidence linking the Financial Crisis of 2008 to illegitimacies in the 
OTC derivatives market, in 2010, great pressure was put on legislatures to implement greater 
regulations on the rather opaque $650 trillion market [Centre for Aviation (2010)]. The Wall 
27 
 
Street Transparency and Accountability Act (2010) was one step in that direction. According to 
the Air Transport Association (ATA), this legislation greatly helped to close loopholes, increase 
transparency, and promote stability in commodity markets. These benefits were crucial to 
making sure that the market speculation, which caused the dramatic 2008 spike in crude oil 
prices, would not happen again. While this bill excluded end users, such as airlines, from having 
to trade through clearinghouses, it had great affects on curbing volatility and increasing 
transparency in the OTC market as a whole. While this legislation may have made it more 
difficult for airlines to lock down favorable hedge positions, the broader security that the bill 
provided to the market was one that the U.S. aviation industry hailed. The main reason why the 
industry was so supportive of the bill was because of its goal to reduce fuel price volatility 
caused by excessive speculation. In conclusion, the increased regulatory pressure and control put 
on the OTC derivatives market, and all almost all financial markets, after the Financial Crisis of 
2008 has led to increased transparency and financial safety in the marketplace. Due to this, we do 
not believe any additional policy's need to be implemented in the commercial aviation fuel 
hedging market in the near future.  
Lastly, we would like to address what we believe would be some future possibilities 
going off this study. First, in order to mitigate the issue of low observations, the data we used 
could be evaluated on a quarterly basis as opposed to a yearly basis. This would allow for a 
much greater number of observations, which may give our model greater accuracy in explaining 
the variability of the response data around its mean, therefore giving a higher r-squared value. A 
higher number of observations would also allow for a more intricate and in-depth analysis of our 
variables. The reason we choose to use yearly aggregates for our variables is simply because 
more data is currently available for yearly figures than for quarterly figures. In the future, 
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however, quarterly data may become more readily available. We also believe our study could 
greatly benefit from the inclusion of Frontier Airlines, American Airlines, and Delta Airlines. 
The reason, again, for the exclusion of these three airlines was due to a lack of data regarding 
each airline's Tobin's Q and financial leverage figures. We hope that in the future, YCharts and 
Morningstar Investment Research will begin to calculate and include this data for these three 
airlines. Lastly, we began accumulating our data just prior to when the Wall Street Transparency 
Act was passed, and no other studies incorporate the years before and after the act was passed. 
The act, as we have explained above, created clear-cut changes in the OTC derivatives market, 
changes that we believe may have modified the way airlines hedge their fuel; whether that be the 
percentages that they hedge, the intermediaries for which they engage in trading, or the type of 
hedge practice they use. Due to this, we believe it would be very interesting to explore the 
potential changes caused by this act. 
Although our study has some shortcomings that prevent our results from predicting the 
future behavior between hedge practices and firm value in commercial airline markets 
worldwide. We believe that our results are pertinent to the U.S. commercial aviation sector in the 
near future. It appears that crude oil prices are going to continue to be rather volatile in the 
coming months, if not years, and we believe our data and results can give members of the 
commercial aviation sector a solid basis for the economic affects hedging has in the U.S. We 
believe the economic trends that we discover in our research point to potential market-based 
problems that airlines may have to weigh when making future decisions regarding their hedge 
practices.   
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List of Tables 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev Min Max 
tobins 54 1.042 0.652 0.289 3.243 
rev 56 8.505 11.038 0.504 38.900 
income 56 276.234 1,291.784 -5,396 7,340 
finlev 53 6.434 11.281 1.54 78.230 
hedge 54 28.166 18.552 0 70 
 
Table 2. Variance Inflation Factors 
Variable VIF 1/VIF 
rev 2.55 0.393 
finlev 2.11 0.474 
income 1.83 0.546 
dummy 1.22 0.817 
hedge 1.04 0.964 
Mean VIF 1.75  
 
Table 3. Dependent Variable tobins in Model 1 
 Model 1 
Dependent Variable tobins 
Constant 1.370127 
(.316) 
X1 -0.0059521 
(.017) 
X2 0.0000761 
(.000) 
X3 -0.0004835 
(.009) 
X4 0.0290273 
(.255) 
X5 -0.0093278 
(.005) 
R2 0.3527 
N 46 
Note: 
All standard errors (se) are in parenthesis 
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Table 4. Dependent Variable tobins in Model 2 
 Model 2 
Dependent Variable tobins 
Constant 1.43968 
(.266) 
X1 -0.0102645 
(.015) 
X2 0.0000748 
(.000) 
X3 -0.0005875 
(.007) 
X4 -0.0103274 
(.005) 
R2 0.3837 
N 46 
Note:  
All standard errors (se) are in parenthesis 
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